Introduction
This paper aims at summarizing the findings of the Global Research Project on the microeconomic determinants of growth in non-OECD countries in 1950-2000. 2 We study the behavior of the main microeconomic agents, namely firms and households, the decisions they make, and the constraints they face with a particular emphasis on the implications for growth. The paper is mainly (but not exclusively) a survey of regional papers on microeconomics of growth. The paper therefore complements the effort made within the Global Research Project (GRP) to explain huge variation in growth rates around the world. Unlike other studies, this project does not exclusively rely upon crosscountry regressions that include institutional variables; the idea is rather to understand what is behind the institutional and structural variables, what determines the productivity growth and factor accumulation at the microeconomic level. These regressions generally explain the variation in growth rates across countries by the large variations in the accumulation of physical and human capital. They do not explain how these variations arise in the first place. The GRP attempts to go beyond just the variation in inputs.
Many important decisions that affect growth, such as to save, invest, innovate, and accumulate human capital, are the results of decisions taken by microeconomic agents.
Therefore, any understanding of the mechanics of growth must begin with the behavior of micro agents. We assume that firms and households across the globe are rational but make different decisions because they operate under different constraints. The regions under the GRP study have vastly different growth experiences in the 20 th century. To what extent has this been the result of differences in firm and household behavior? We believe that comparative analysis of microeconomic determinants of growth in different regions (e.g. East Asia vs. Africa) may shed light on this question. The purpose of the regional papers was to study how these constraints in each region gave rise to differences in firm and household behavior, which may have contributed to differences in aggregate growth. In this review, we take stock of the knowledge generated by these studies in an attempt to learn some general lessons. These lessons should be used as guidelines for 2 Detailed information about the Global Research Project can be found at www.gdnet.org further studies of economic growth at the country level. In this sense, this paper should be considered a bridge between regional papers and country studies. Our goal is to identify the most important issues emerging from the regional papers and provide a unified framework for the authors of the country studies so that all the country studies will be produced on the same grounds.
Other overview papers dealing with the macro view (Soludo and Kim, 2002), markets (Jurajda and Mitchell, 2002) , and political economy (Castanheira and Esfahani, 2002) similarly attempt to summarize the findings of the regional papers in their respective areas and act as a bridge to country studies. This paper is perfectly complementary to the paper by Jurajda and Mitchell (2002) on the role of markets on growth. They describe the environment in which micro agents operate and we study how microeconomic agents respond to that environment. We take the incentive structure defined by the markets and institutions as given while they explain where the incentives come from. Part of the environment and the institutional structure that we take as given is a product of the policy choices studied in the political economy paper (Castanheira and Esfahani, 2002) . At the same time, since the behavior of the microeconomic agents feeds back on policy choices and helps shape the environment, our paper provides input to the papers on markets and growth and political economy. For example, while political economy explains which policies are chosen, understanding how they are implemented and what the outcomes are requires understanding the behavior of microeconomic agents. For example, the outcome of a policy to promote gender equity depends very much on how families make intrahousehold allocation decisions. Similarly, the effects of an educational subsidy intended to even the playing field for the disadvantaged depend on household behavior, which determines the extent to which child education depends on parental education. An important distinction with the macro paper by Soludo and Kim (2002) , and to some extent with all other overview papers, is that the microeconomic determinants of growth exhibit huge variations not only across regions but within countries. Thus, speaking of African and Latin American scenarios can be rather misleading: many differences arise at the microeconomic level. This is not to deny that regional similarities exist that may allow one to compare the 'typical' African case with the typical 'East Asian' case, only that one should keep in mind the limitations of such abstract concepts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a general structure for a microeconomic analysis of determinants of growth. We describe the main microeconomic agents and discuss in what ways their behavior can influence growth.
Then, in the main part of the paper (Sections 3 and 4) we provide a more specific account of what has actually happened in different regions and countries of the world, what factors have been more important and why. In Section 3 we concentrate on households, and in Section 4 we focus on firms. Section 5 contains concluding remarks and discusses possible avenues for future research.
An overview of microeconomic determinants of growth in non-OECD economies
The main microeconomic agents are firms and households. For economic growth to take off, households should supply factors of production (labor, physical capital, and human capital) and firm should put these factors to the best use (adopt better technologies). A closer look at these decisions reveals a great number of factors that can promote or hinder growth at the microeconomic level. In this section we briefly consider households and firms in turn.
Households
The most important household decisions that affect economic growth are to procreate, to save, and to transfer knowledge and assets to the next generation. These decisions are interdependent and are affected by the environment in which families find themselves.
For example, parents who wish to provide for their old age will consider the options to purchase a financial or physical asset, have many children to increase the probability that they will be taken care of, or invest in the human capital of a few children hoping that they would have the means to help. Which options they take will depend on the expected benefits and costs. These benefits and costs are largely determined by the endowments, institutions, and the level of development of the country, while at the same time they influence economic growth. Households make other important decisions that primarily affect the static allocation of resources, but that have implications for growth. For example, how to cope with risk and how much labor to supply are decisions that affect production but their impact on growth is indirect, through factor accumulation and improvement in the overall efficiency of the economy.
A firmly established finding of the development literature is that economic growth fundamentally transforms household decisions. In the course of economic development strategies based on high fertility and low investment in children give way to those based on low fertility and high investment in human capital (Becker, Murphy, Tamura, 1990 ).
This change is often accompanied by a reversal in the direction of intergenerational transfers, a point which Caldwell (1976) has highlighted as a key feature of the development process. He describes developed countries as those in which net intergenerational transfers are from parents to their children, in the form of human capital and other assets, and developing countries as those in which transfers are from children to parents, in the form of farm labor and provision of old age security. The process through which this transformation takes place-the demographic transition-is well-known, but how and why countries and regions enter this phase is less clear. The key to a better understanding of this transition is to analyze the factors that motivate the individual units -households -to shift from a regime of high fertility and low investments in children to its converse. We will return to this point later in section 3.
Savings and investment decisions are also closely intertwined with fertility and human capital decisions. One important link between the two sets of decisions arises because of intertemporal consumption smoothing. It is widely believed that high fertility serves in part the purpose of providing for old age. Where credit markets are developed, they enable households to postpone consumption by lending when young and consuming when old. In these circumstances households would be less inclined to have large families and thereby switch to greater bequest in the form of human capital. The need for intergenerational transfers provides another link between household investment decisions on human and financial capital. Personal savings intended for bequest can serve as a substitute for human capital investments in children. In other words, altruistic parents may choose to leave their bequest in the form of human capital or other assets depending on the productivity of each investment.
Firms
The other microeconomic agents, crucial for growth, are firms that use the factors supplied by the households through the factor markets and make production and investment decisions. We will distinguish between two types of firms: small businesses and large firms. 3 The challenges these two types of agents face may be quite different.
For a small business the main challenge is to survive and grow. The large firm has already achieved (or overgrown) the optimal scale so that the main task is to restructure in response to the changing external conditions and to increase productivity.
In most non-OECD countries small businesses are much more important than in the developed economies (precisely due to barriers to growth that we will discuss below). For example, in MENA large firms (greater than 100 employees) account for only 2% of employment. Table 1 In most of the non-OECD countries, small businesses operate in a rather hostile environment facing numerous barriers to entry and growth, including credit and insurance markets imperfections, rent-seeking by private rackets, predatory regulation and taxation by government officials. Hence many potentially efficient small businesses are not established, some do not survive, and some do not grow to their optimal scale and/or scope. Also, some firms prefer to stay in the informal rather than formal sector. We will try to understand which constraints are binding in different countries and what the implications for growth are. As for the large firms, the incentives to restructure and invest in new technologies also depend on the external environment. We will discuss the role of financial imperfections, domestic and foreign competition, privatization, and institutions of contract and property rights enforcement.
Treating the distinction between small and large firms as static may be misleading. As mentioned above, the essence of development process is the transformation of small (and informal) firms into large (and formal) ones. 5 However, due to the barriers the small businesses face, many of them are stuck in the informal sector and cannot grow.
Therefore, many economies find themselves in a (low-level) equilibrium where the size of the informal sector remains very high.
2.3
The main findings of the regional papers
Households
To the extent that behavior at the micro level determines the rates of physical and human capital accumulation, a careful study of firm and household behavior in different parts of the world should reveal deeper sources of variation in growth than we have been able to uncover so far using cross-country regressions. The role of the six regional studies on the theme of the microeconomics of growth has been to define the key issues for each region and help coordinate the country studies that would follow. Although on the whole the micro thematic papers have succeeded in raising the key issues, the main part of the task of identifying the micro sources of variation in growth remains for country studies.
The thematic papers were asked to follow the model set by Collier and Gunning (1999) , the microeconomics paper on Africa. Collier and Gunning chose two types of micro agents, manufacturing firms and rural households, which play the critical roles in African 5 The fact that small size of average business is negatively correlated with growth in developing countries has been established both through cross-country analysis (Liedholm and Mead, 1987, Banerji, 1978) , and through analysis across time within countries (Little, Mazumdar, and Page, 1987; Steel, 1993 The main question for all micro studies was to assess the contribution, or lack thereof, of these micro agents to growth given the environment they faced. The aim was to assess the degree to which the variation in growth experience of different regions of the world could be explained by the behavior of rational agents facing different constraints as defined by the external environment. For this purpose, the environment would be defined in such a way as to be exogenous to household decisions. Success in explaining good and bad outcomes of household decisions depends very much on the extent to which one can assume exogeneity of the constraints.
For Sub-Saharan Africa, Collier and Gunning (1999) identify risks arising from soil and climate conditions and disease as the environment that has shaped the behavior of micro agents in general and rural households in particular. They argue that in the absence of appropriate insurance markets, these risks force micro agents into inefficient diversification that inhibits growth. Micro agents in the traditional economy were able to develop organizations and institutions that helped them cope with risk, but these solutions were costly in terms of growth, because they required investments in lineage and foregone specialization. These characterizations of the environment are first and foremost hypotheses to be tested by country studies that will follow the regional paper. As such they are subject to challenge on two grounds at least, significance for growth and exogeneity. Boserup (1965) , argues that reducing such risks, for example with irrigation, is only economical when population density reaches a certain level, a condition which was not fulfilled for a long time in many parts of Africa.
Papers on East and South Asia do not identify any specific regional characteristics that explain household behavior in their regions. In East Asia, Kuncoro (2000) sees the effective role of households in physical and human capital accumulation as the product of several factors: a good policy environment that emphasized the supply of primary education, the development of labor intensive industries that raised the return to such education, and a relatively equal income distribution. For South Asia, where the focus is on rural households, the authors mention risk and inequality as factors that inhibit household accumulation of savings and human capital.
Firms
Our knowledge of the behavior of firms in developing countries is still far behind our understanding of firms in OECD economies. There are at least three important reasons why this is the case. First, given that human capital both in private and in public sector is still very low, there is no wonder that the quality of official statistical data is far from satisfactory. Second, most of the statistical data cover only large firms while the majority of employment is by small businesses and farms. Third, the official statistics covers virtually none of the informal sector which constitutes a much larger share of GDP than in OECD economies. 6 Therefore it is no wonder that our knowledge of firms' behavior is rather patchy. All six regional papers on microeconomics recognize the importance of modern firms for growth, but only three papers ( to analyze their impact. This is why the authors discuss mainly the reform packages rather than their effect on productivity and growth. 7 However, they do provide limited evidence that the reform has increased efficiency but also resulted in job losses.
Kuncoro ( to compare the impact of financial repression and subsequent financial liberalization on efficiency. The paper argues that financial repression has resulted in misallocation of investment and even over-investment in large firms. 8 Loans were directed towards large firms while small businesses were liquidity constrained. Financial liberalization has helped to reallocate the domestic credit to small firms but the small firms still borrow at significantly higher rates. There is no sufficient microeconomic data to carry out firmlevel analysis, but the evidence from industry-level analysis confirms that openness, FDI and access to external finance result in higher factor productivity.
Guriev and Ickes (2000) study both small and large firms in CEE-FSU region. The paper identifies two growth scenarios-'typical CEE' and 'typical FSU' ones. In the typical CEE scenario, small business grow to their optimal scale while in the FSU case small businesses stay small (and to a large extent informal) because of the predatory regulation by government. Large firms that restructure rather successfully in the CEE countries fail to do so in the FSU. The authors explain the growth in CEE by competition and openness (determined both by policies and Soviet-time legacies) and elimination of direct and implicit subsidies. The paper also emphasizes the role of EU accession for the CEE countries that serves as an anchor to coordinate expectations (which is essential for getting out of the lack-of-restructuring trap). It is interesting that some countries (e.g. Romania) fall into the CEE category in terms of small business development while following FSU scenario in terms of large firm restructuring.
How households contribute to growth
Recent theories of economic growth recognize a greater role for households than before.
The shift in emphasis in growth theory from physical to human capital, beginning with
Lucas ( 
Savings
For the answer to the first question, the importance of household savings for growth, we first turn to theory. We consider both aggregate growth models that define the role of savings in growth and micro models that account for individual behavior. Neoclassical theory, e.g. Solow (1956) While a positive association appears to exist, empirically it is not possible to support or reject either view of the causation (Gersovitz, 1988 Siddiqui (2000) argue that households in rural South Asia save primarily for short term consumption smoothing. In many African countries, lack of credit markets prevents poorer rural households from smoothing their consumption even on a short-term basis.
Unlike in South Asia where private money lenders operate, in Sub-Saharan Africa even informal credit markets are hampered by lack of private property in land which can serve as collateral (Collier and Gunning, 1999) . Perhaps this is one reason why other credit institutions, such as rotating credit associations, are more prevalent in Africa than elsewhere.
Savings are also sensitive to instability in the macroeconomic environment. As the papers in this volume by Soludo and Kim on sources of growth and Jurajda and Mitchell on markets and growth note, there is consensus that macroeconomic stability is good for savings, but the consensus is much weaker on the role of financial liberalization.
Stability increases confidence in the financial systems and encourages households to place their savings in instruments that channel resources to firms. But higher real interest rates that better reflect the scarcity of funds, a main objective of financial liberalization, may not increase savings. There is evidence that a rise in real interest rates increases capital formation (Fry, 1979 ), but it is not clear that it actually promotes household savings. Kuncoro (2000) credits macroeconomic stability for the savings boom in the East Asian economies, even though it was in part achieved with financial repression that reduced both inflation and lending rates at banks. Household savings appear to have benefited from the stability offered by low-inflation without suffering much from the low interest rates. Economic theory is not clear on the role of interest rates on personal savings. In the life cycle model, for example, the impact of low or negative interest rates on personal savings may go either way.
Labor supply
The supply of labor, the most important factor of production, in the short and the long run results from household choices between work and leisure, work at home or in the market, and fertility. The significance of labor force increase for economic growth is best documented by the growth experience of the fast growing East Asian countries. Young Women's ability to earn income from market work raises the opportunity cost of their time at home which can lead to lower fertility and increased investment in human capital.
East Asia, where fertility decline and increased participation of women have gone hand in hand, provides the strongest evidence of a link between labor force allocation decisions and growth. East Asia now has the highest rates of participation for women, followed by transition economies of FSU-CEE (Figure 3.1) . In Sub-Saharan Africa women also report a high incidence of market work but it is mostly in household production in rural areas, which is not as significant for growth as wage work because it does not raise the cost of children and therefore does not affect the fertility choice. This grand reallocation of labor from low to high productivity sectors a la Lewis has received more attention in the development literature, but job allocation at a smaller scale, within industries or even firms, also affects labor productivity and growth (Topel, 1999) . Labor supply decisions that affect the level of worker effort and the quality of the match between workers and jobs matter for growth. As discussed in Jurajda and Mitchell in this volume, well-functioning labor market provides the incentives for individuals to apply effort, to search for jobs that match their skills, and accumulate the type of human capital that is most productive. Where labor markets have been inflexible, such as in MENA and CEE-FSU before transition, the low quality of job matches have lowered labor productivity and reduced incentives for learning specific skills (Salehi-Isfahani, 2000).
Labor market rigidities associated with implicit and explicit promises of tenure in employment discourage labor turnover and thereby reduce worker incentives to supply effort and to acquire human capital, as well as reduce the likelihood of optimal job matches. Although we know that labor market institutions differ across countries, we know little about how different institutions affect economic growth. In general the study of the role of labor markets and growth has not gone beyond the recognition that human capital matters for growth (Topel, 1999) . Country studies commissioned under the GRP should be able to throw light on this important link.
Fertility and human capital
The increasing importance of human capital in growth theory has focused attention on the central role of fertility and child investment decisions of household in economic development (Lucas, 1998) the economics literature, where it is believed that while differential access to birth control cannot be ruled out as explanation of high fertility in some countries, after decades of worldwide dissemination it is difficult to explain much of the international variation in fertility in this way (Schultz, 1994) . A technological hypothesis of a different kind by Galor and Weil (1994) can also explain how fertility decline is initiated. Technological change increases the return to mental labor thereby raising the wages of women relative to men and thereby increases the cost of children and lowering fertility. The model does not include human capital as an explicit variable.
Perhaps the most important argument has to do with exogenous increases in the returns to education. Two factors can be considered as causing an exogenous shift in returns to human capital. First, a decline in mortality, specifically youth mortality, increases the likelihood that young infants will survive to become productive adults and therefore increased the returns to investing in them. Second, technological change can increase returns to skills (Schultz 1975 , Huffman 2001 ) and initiate a decline in fertility.
Arguments pertaining to low returns to education are reported in the regional studies but they do not all arise for the same reasons. For Africa, where fertility transition has been particularly slow, Collier and Gunning (1999) offer low returns to education as an explanation for high fertility. In rural areas private returns are the constraint because social returns are considered to be high. Nor is the higher private rate of return in the urban labor markets sufficient to induce rural households to investment in child education because the probability of employment there is low.
Gender bias may also lower returns to education for the whole economy. In South Asia, where the gender gap in education is particularly wide, Ranade and Siddiqui (2000) note that poverty and lack of access to credit forces parents to limit investment in female children. Because of the central role played by female education in human capital accumulation, this lowers education in the long run. Low female education lowers the cost of child quantity relative to quality, thereby favoring high fertility over education in family decision making. At the same time low female education raises the cost of child quality, because mothers provide important input into child education. A positive association between mother and child education (usually stronger than father-child education) has been widely observed in developed and developing countries (Strauss and Thomas, 1995) . In MENA countries, social norms that restrict women's choice of market work similarly lower return to female education (Salehi-Isfahani, 2000) . This is a plausible explanation for why MENA countries, after Sub-Saharan Africa, have had the slowest fertility transition. For Latin America and the Caribbean, Behrman et al (2000) discuss the quantity-quality choice by noting that macroeconomic instability and low quality of public schooling have limited the accumulation of human capital.
As Pritchett notes in the conclusion to this volume, empirical studies of growth find very low impact of education on growth. Most growth regressions show that the initial level of a country's human capital is important for growth whereas increase in human capital is not (Topel, 1999) . The low observed social returns are in sharp contrast with the high rates of private return estimated from micro data, which, presumably, guide private actions. One possibility for resolving this apparent puzzle is that institutional variation in the markets for labor and human capital, where private returns are determined, lead to variation in the social returns. In other words, high private returns can be consistent with 
Firms
In this Section we discuss the main themes on the contribution of firms to growth as analyzed in the regional papers. We start with a short survey of ideas of each paper (section 4.1), then we go through all factors that promote or constrain growth in small and large firms (Sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively), discussing whether these factors are relevant in different regions and why. In Section 4.4 we summarize the findings from the regional papers in the form of 'growth scenarios' trying to classify the growth experience of regions and sub-regions into three broad categories.
Small business development
In this section we discuss incentives and constraints relevant for establishment and growth of the small business, and the choice of formal and informal sectors of the economy. Even given the data limitations, it is common knowledge that in many non-OECD countries it is hard to establish a small business and once established, small firms rarely manage to reach the minimum efficiency scale (De Soto, 1989 , Tybout 2000 ). On the other hand, the economic growth in developing countries presumes that small firms take off and become modern industrial corporations (in the success story of East Asia, almost all of the 30 leading corporations have grown out of small family businesses). This is why in this section we will try to understand which factors constrain the growth of small business in non-OECD regions.
The most widely discussed constraint for small business establishment and growth is the lack of access to credit. Indeed, even if credit markets exist in a developing economy Apparently, the loans are obtained through the informal credit markets and the institutions of micro credit (see Morduch, 1998 , Besley, Coate and Loury, 1993 , Woolcock, 1996 . This is rather intuitive. First, the economies of scale in lending are often correlated with the increasing returns in savings. The banks do not offer high rates on small deposits. Therefore there is a substantial supply of savings (that banks are not interested in) which are used to finance the establishment of small businesses either through the informal credit market or the intra-family transfer. The family networks in the developing countries are relatively extensive and often include the family members working abroad and sending their wages back as remittances. 11 The firms are so small that financing through family networks or informal credit markets may be sufficient.
Moreover, the other barriers to growth result in limited competition and large unattended market niches so that the firms that do survive can finance their needs by reinvesting the current profits.
A more important problem is the limited access to insurance. In non-OECD countries, entrepreneurs face risks which are related to weather, world prices for raw materials, macroeconomic instability, et cetera. 12 Those risks cannot be insured by the informal insurance markets since the latter are usually local-based and therefore cannot diversify against region-wide risks. The problem is aggravated by the lack of agglomeration and poor transportation infrastructure that keeps small businesses very specialized and therefore highly vulnerable to risk.
The businesses that cater to metropolitan areas or foreign markets are more protected from volatility since the customers' income is sufficiently diversified. This suggests the importance of economic geography: large cities and densely populated areas are privileged, while land-locked and isolated areas are disadvantaged (see Sachs et al., 1999 for cross-country evidence, and the regional papers by Abdel-Fadil, 2000, Collier and
Gunning, 1999, Guriev and Ickes, 2000) . The situation can and should be improved by investing in infrastructure. On the other hand, investment is necessary but not sufficient:
in many countries physical infrastructure is available but is monopolized and run inefficiently.
At the same time, these same regional papers on MENA, SSA, and CEE-FSU document the importance of predatory regulation as a barrier to entry and growth. 13 Why is this the case? Governments have incentives for predation both at the high level (policy choice) and the low level (the policy implementation). Given that the small businesses are dispersed and weak politically, public policy is more supportive of large firms that get more subsidies and protection from foreign competition.
14 At the level of policy implementation, the corrupt bureaucrats (and even judges) use their discretion to extend red tape and introduce new regulations in order to extort bribes that would complement their meager wages. It is very important to distinguish these two phenomena: in many countries, the central government adopts policies conducive to business growth, but virtually in all non-OECD countries (except East Asia, see Kuncoro, 2000) low-level corruption undermines implementation of these policies.
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Corruption and the over-regulation that it breeds is not only burdensome for small businesses, it also makes businesses to slide into the informal sector. Table 4 .1 shows that 13 It is also interesting to compare the results of regional papers with a survey of 3,600 entrepreneurs in 69 countries on obstacles for doing business by Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1997) . In general, the results are very similar: indeed, financing was not named as a major problem in any of the regions. The entrepreneurs were more concerned about lack of infrastructure (which as we discussed above is related to risk and volatility), corruption, taxes and regulation (and imperfect judiciary system). There is a substantial variation across regions: e.g. in Asia entrepreneurs trust government while in other regions they are very skeptical about both government's policy and its implementation; in CEE, entrepreneurs ranked corruption below financing, which means that government predation is relatively weak. One should, however, be careful in comparing the results of this survey with the regional papers: the survey included both small and large firms, and it is not clear to what extent the surveyed firms are representative of the respective countries and regions.
14 Protectionist policies create an additional burden on small businesses through increased costs of imported inputs.
informal employment is a rule rather than exception in developing economies.
Entrepreneurs cannot comply with all the regulations and simply bribe the officials that allow them to operate in the shadow economy.
The large spread of the informal economy has important implications for growth. First, it strips the government of tax revenues so that the government has to increase the tax burden on those who remain in the formal sector or decrease spending on law and order.
In both cases, the incentives to stay in the shadow sector increase further, making the informal economy self-perpetuating. Second, small businesses have an additional disincentive to grow. Larger firms are more visible, and growth results in entry to the official economy, which is costly. In addition to predatory regulation, governments contribute to the hostility of small business environment by the failure to protect property rights and enforce contract law.
The private sector responds to this government failure by creating its own enforcement institutions, often criminalized and violent (mafia-like networks), but still more effective than corrupt and slow courts. Once small businesses resort to using these informal institutions, they fall into the vicious circle of informal economy. The entrepreneurs become vulnerable to rackets and bribe extortion by organized crime and corrupt bureaucrats.
To illustrate how important is the government predation for the growth of small businesses, let us consider the example from the CEE-FSU regional paper. Some Central
European governments have managed to provide the small business with a friendly environment while FSU countries are similar to the typical non-OECD case (see Table   4 .2). This helped the small business growth to take off in CEE so that the number of small businesses per capita is ten (!) times higher in Poland (and other CEE countries) than in Russia (Guriev and Ickes, 2000) . Not surprisingly, the growth performance of Poland is much better than that of Russia. 
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Large industrial firms
Industrial firms play a major role in economic development. Contrary to widespread opinion inherited from the early views of developing countries, the share of industry in GDP in non-OECD countries is comparable to those in OECD economies. 17 The existing large manufacturing firms in most developing countries were created in nonmarket conditions or under heavy protection from domestic and/or foreign competition. 18 Therefore improvements in economic performance depend on enterprise restructuring. rates in the 1960s that ran well into double-digit and even triple-digit numbers. In East Asia, large firms have benefited from financial repression policies that shifted investment supply into their favor (Kuncoro, 2000) . The pressure on managers to undertake restructuring may come from a few sources. The first and the most important one is ownership: privatization and enforcement of property rights of outside owners. The second one is competition (we will distinguish between domestic and foreign competition). The third one is hard budget constraints and elimination of subsidies. In theory it is clear that each of these factors reduces the room for 'managerial slack' and provides incentives for restructuring. The question is which of these factors has a larger effect on managerial incentives, and whether these factors are substitutes or complements in affecting the performance of individual firms.
We will also discuss how the factors that influence incentives to restructure interact with imperfections of financial markets that constraint ability to restructure. As Jurajda and
Mitchell (2000) argue, the development of financial markets is very low in most non-OECD countries. Only East Asian (see Kuncoro, 2000) and Central and East European firms (Guriev and Ickes, 2000) have access to finance at the interest rates comparable to their OECD counterparts.
Although there exists a growing literature on productivity in manufacturing firms in the developing countries, solid microeconomic evidence is still limited (Tybout, 2000) . There is an array of research on transition economies (see Frydman et al, 1999, Djankov and Murrell, 2002) , and selected countries in Latin America (Tybout, 2000) , East Asia (Kuncoro, 2000) , Africa (Clerides et al., Tybout, 2000) and India (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000) . Even these studies often suffer from poor quality of the data. The most obvious problem is the selection bias: it is not clear whether the private firms are doing better because private ownership is superior or because better firms were privatized in the first place. Analysis of the effect of competition may be subject to the endogeneity problemthe market structure is not independent of efficiency (Nickell, 1996) . 20 Certainly, panel data analysis would help, but large balanced panels are usually not available, so most research resorts to cross-sectional analysis. 21 Theoretically, efficiency-enhancing restructuring would be undertaken once the firm is privatized. The evidence however implies that privatization does not always bring restructuring and productivity gains (Guriev and Ickes, 2000) . There are several reasons for this. First, in many countries, corporate governance is still underdeveloped so that the outside owners have little control over management (see the paper by Juraida and Mitchell in this volume). Moreover, development of corporate governance institutions may be very difficult politically. Some authors insist that full-fledge investor protection is not feasible at this stage in non-OECD countries, so one should concentrate on protection of majority shareholders and large creditors (Berglof and von Thadden, 1999). 20 As Brown and Earle (2001) argue, endogeneity seems to be a lesser problem in transition economies that inherited industrial structure from a non-market system. Likewise, the market structure in Latin America and South Asia may be also exogenous because of high protection rates during the import substitution industrialization policies. 21 For a striking example of the difference between cross-section and panel data estimates see Yudaeva et al. (2000) paper on the spillovers of FDI in Russia. The cross-section analysis suggests that FDI have negative spillovers on local firms' productivity, while the panel data prove that the spillovers are positive. The matter is that FDI are biased towards the industry with low productivity and therefore high growth potential.
Another issue is elimination of subsidies and soft-budget constraints. As Shleifer and Vishny (1994) show, a manager-owner of a private firm may prefer not to restructure to preserve excess employment, and subsidies are the main tool to make side payments from politicians to reward a manager's compliance with the political agenda. The modern theory of soft-budget constraints (Berglof and Roland, 1998) suggest that the soft budget constraints emerge due to the lack of commitment on the creditors' side, which is of course very common in developing economies. The evidence from transition (DjankovMurrell, 2000) and developing (Kuncoro, 2000) countries suggest that subsidies (and cheap credit) do distort incentives to restructure and may even result in a vicious circle of survival-without-restructuring. The managers keep delaying restructuring in hopes of a bailout from the government. Therefore, the elimination of soft budget constraints is complementary to privatization to promote growth-oriented restructuring. 22 The existing literature suggests that the strongest incentives for restructuring are provided by competition. To various extents, the effect is observed in all countries (Brown and There are still no clear and unambiguous answers to these questions. Apparently, in CEE and Latin American countries, the major effect comes from competition from imports. In
East Asian economies exporting firms that are subject to competition in the global economy also benefit from foreign competition. In the CIS countries domestic demonopolization plays the key role while the role of import penetration is less clear. Djankov and Murrell (2002) suggest that the effect of import competition in FSU is often 22 One should be aware, though, that elimination of explicit subsidies may be not enough for hardening budget constraints. Soft budget constraints often come across as tax and inter-enterprise arrears, nonperforming bank loans etc. (Djankov and Murrell, 2002 , and Gaddy and Ickes, 1998).
insignificant, but this may be driven by the quality of data. In the only panel data analysis available (Brown and Earle, 2000) , the effect is positive and significant.
There are very few studies that look into the effect of the factor market structure. This is not because it is unimportant (see the paper by Juraida and Mitchell in this volume), rather because measuring labor and capital market structure is hard. Kuncoro (2000) argues that the capital market liberalization has significantly improved incentives and relaxed financial constraints for East Asian firms, but the evidence is rather qualitative (before and after reform). One notable exception is Brown and Earle (2000) who look at the effect of local labor market competition in Russia. Given the low geographical mobility of Russian workers and lack of unionization, local labor market concentration gives employers a monopsony power (Guriev and Friebel, 2000) . Brown and Earle (2000) show that local labor market concentration negatively affects firm-level productivity.
The other question is whether there can or cannot be 'too much' competition.
Theoretically, the higher competition, the better. However, once financial markets imperfections are taken into account, it turns out that the effect is ambiguous: while incentives to restructure do indeed increase with competition, the sources of finance dry up. If the credit market is imperfect, then the firms have to finance restructuring out of their profits. Thus, if competition is too harsh, the firms just cannot afford productivityenhancing restructuring. This is precisely the finding of Seabright et al., EBRD (1999) who show that while monopolies restructure less than firms having 1 to 3 competitors, further increase of competition (more than 3 competitors) makes the firms less likely to undertake restructuring. This suggests that directed credit policies in East Asia (Kuncoro, 2000) , although distortionary, may have mitigated this problem, giving East Asian firms a chance to finance their growth under harsh competition in the global economy. It is interesting that productivity may go up not only after an actual increase in foreign competition but also after a credible promise of opening up. In many CEE countries, the announcement of EU accession has made a substantial difference, providing an important benchmark: the only way to survive in five years is to start restructuring now.
Growth scenarios
Summing up the analysis of findings of the regional papers along the dimensions above, one can come up with three broad 'growth scenarios'.
1. Successful development (East Asia, CEE, LAC in recent years). Openness and foreign competition provide large firms with incentives to restructure and invest (including through foreign direct investments). Government does not prey upon small businesses, so they grow until they face financial constraints. 3. Lagging behind (MENA, SSA). Poor infrastructure and lack of agglomeration make risk and volatility the binding constraint for business development.
Government predation and financial imperfections are also present, but are relatively less important (especially financing) for small business growth. Large firms are virtually absent, and there is almost no chance for a small business to grow beyond the family size and to survive the founder.
5
Concluding remarks
This paper summarizes the findings from the GRP regional papers on the microeconomic determinants of growth around the world. We discuss the decisions by households to supply factors of production and by firms to put the factors to the best use. Although the microeconomics of growth varies greatly across regions and countries, it turns out to be possible to distinguish several growth scenarios and set an agenda for further research in the country studies.
No set of common factors explains the lack of effective contributions by households to growth. There are two lessons that have emerged so far. First, that although it is difficult to get an agreement on the role of household savings in growth, it is possible to say that a stable macro environment and effective financial intermediation enhance this role.
Second, the role of households in human capital accumulation is probably the most important role they play in modern economic growth. The household is the principal unit through which the transfer of human capital from one generation to the next takes place. On the other hand, the determinants of restructuring and productivity growth in large firms are similar in all the regions. It turns out that the major forces that provide incentives to restructure are competition and openness. Competition contributes to restructuring and growth both directly and through reinforcing the effects of privatization and helping to eliminate soft budget constraints. Openness is not only a source of external competition but also facilitates the foreign direct investments which helps to overcome financial underdevelopment.
The microeconomic determinants of growth identified by the regional studies have to be further explored by the country studies. While we have been able to define regional 'growth scenarios', at the country level the growth experience may not purely fall into one of the scenarios. However, our discussion of the regional paper findings may be used as a framework for the analysis at the country level.
